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COMMENTS
RECOVERY OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 17 OF THE
WARSAW CONVENTION: THE
AMERICAN VERSUS THE ISRAELI
APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
International courts have been inconsistent in their deci-
sions as to whether, under the Warsaw Convention, plaintiffs
should be allowed to recover damages for purely emotional inju-
ries resulting from aircraft accidents. Two diametrically opposed
views on recovery are exemplified by the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Israel. The
United States Supreme Court has refused to allow recovery of
purely psychic damages. The Supreme Court of Israel, on the
other hand, has maintained that the Warsaw Convention allows
for recovery of emotional distress damages. This inconsistency
on the international level has caused confusion among judges
and scholars worldwide and has enabled prospective plaintiffs to
shop for a forum which would better serve their purposes.
In April 1991, the United States Supreme Court reversed
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd,1 thereby denying
passengers recovery for psychic trauma. The Supreme Court's
decision in Floyd resolved the question, long debated among the
lower courts, of whether the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air2
(commonly known as the "Warsaw Convention"), a multina-
1. 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
2. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, Oct 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (adhered to by the U.S. on June 27, 1934)
[hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
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tional treaty governing air carrier liability, allows an airline pas-
senger to collect damages for emotional distress unaccompanied
by bodily injuries.3 While providing for uniformity in the ap-
proach of American courts to this question, the Supreme Court's
decision has generated an inconsistency on an international
level.
In 1984, the Supreme Court of Israel, the only other su-
preme court that has contended with the issue,4 asserted in Air
France v. Teichner5 that the Warsaw Convention does create a
cause of action for purely psychic injuries sustained during in-
ternational flight accidents.' Given these differing interpreta-
tions, when other parties to the Convention are confronted with
this issue, some may choose to follow the precedent set by the
Supreme Court of the United States, while others may prefer to
adhere to the Israeli interpretation. Such opposing interpreta-
tions by the courts of different countries would encourage airline
passengers who have suffered emotional distress on international
flights to shop for forums which would allow for recovery. The
Warsaw Convention's drafters' goal of providing international
uniformity in liability for aircraft accidents would thus be
frustrated.
The debate surrounding the airlines' liability for emotional
damages sustained in an air carrier accident focuses on the
3. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the New York Court of Appeals' deci-
sion in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 314 N.E.2d 848 (Ct. App.
1974), which held that emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury is not com-
pensable under Article 17, and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in this case which permit-
ted such recovery. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1489 (1991).
Lower courts which have allowed recovery for purely psychic injuries under Article
17 are: Borham v. Pan American World Airways, 19 Aviation Cases 18, (CCH) 236
(S.D.N.Y. 1986); Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal.
1975); Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Palagonia
v. Trans World Airlines, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
Other lower courts have held that Article 17 does not encompass purely psychic
damages: Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973); Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transport Co., 351 F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
4. Israel and the United States are both parties to the Warsaw Convention. RENE H.
MANKIEWICZ, THE LIABILITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL AR CARRIER 232-34 (1981).
5. 38 (I1) P.D. 785 (Isr. 1984). This Supreme Court case is a consolidation of two
district court cases - Dadon v. Air France and Air France v. Teichner. Hereinafter, the
Air France v. Teichner cite will refer to the Supreme Court resolution of both of these
cases.
6. Id. at 786.
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proper meaning of the French phrase "lesion corporelle" that
appears in Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. Article 17 cre-
ates a cause of action for passengers injured in aircraft accidents
during international flights. If translated literally as "bodily in-
jury," the phrase "l6sion corporelle" would not permit recovery
for purely emotional damages. However, if interpreted more
broadly as "personal injury," recovery for such damages may be
available. The Supreme Court of the United States has chosen
to interpret the phrase "l6sion corporelle" as "bodily injury,"
while the Supreme Court of Israel has interpreted it more
broadly as "personal injury."
This Comment will compare the approaches of the Supreme
Court of the United States in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd7 and the
Israeli Supreme Court in Air France v. Teichner.8 The intent of
the drafters of the Warsaw Convention will be explored by ex-
amining the French legal meaning of "l6sion corporelle," the ne-
gotiating history of the Convention, and the subsequent conduct
of the parties to the Convention. Finally, the Comment will dis-
cuss how the goals of the drafters of the Convention relate to the
two different interpretations of Article 17. This Comment will
conclude that nothing in the language, negotiating history, or
post-enactment interpretations of Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention clearly evinces intent by the drafters to allow airline
passengers to recover damages for purely mental injuries. In
support of the United States Supreme Court decision, this Com-
ment will further conclude that Article 17 of the Warsaw Con-
vention did not authorize the Supreme Court of Israel to main-
tain that recovery for emotional damages unaccompanied by
physical injury is permitted in the event of an aircraft accident.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention is a multilateral treaty which es-
tablishes uniform standards governing international air carriage
of passengers, cargo, and baggage, and regulates the liability of
international air carriers.9 This treaty governs only international
7. 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
8. 38 (III) P.D. 785 (Isr. 1984).
9. Gregory C. Sisk, Recovery for Emotional Distress Under the Warsaw Conven-
tion: The Elusive Search for the French Legal Meaning of Ltsion Corporelle, 25 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 127, 129 (1990).
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flights; it does not govern domestic flights within the United
States or any other country. The 1929 Treaty was the result of a
1925 international conference held in Paris, the work done by
the interim Comit6 International Technique d'Experts Juridique
Ariens (CITEJA) (a committee created by the Paris Confer-
ence),' 0 and a final conference in Warsaw in 1929. The Warsaw
Convention was initially signed by twenty-three countries but, in
later years, many other countries have adopted the treaty.11 To-
day, due to the remarkable growth of civil aviation since 1929,12
over 120 nations have chosen to become parties to the treaty,
making it both a significant and widely recognized international
agreement.13
In drafting the treaty, the participants of the Warsaw Con-
vention attempted to fulfill three distinct objectives. First, in or-
der to protect and encourage the growth of the infant airline in-
dustry, the drafters intended to limit the potential liability of air
carriers resulting from accidents."4 Second, because air travel
transversed national boundaries and necessarily involved vary-
ing legal systems, commercial practices, and languages, the par-
ties wished to establish uniform rules to govern the rights and
liabilities of air carriers.15 Third, the parties to the Convention
wished to ensure that passengers, who would naturally have dif-
ficulty proving that the air carrier failed to use all the necessary
precautions to avoid accidents, would nonetheless be able to re-
cover damages from the air carriers. 16
The Convention achieved these goals by establishing uni-
form rules on documentation, ticketing, jurisdiction, and liabil-
ity. The parties agreed that air carriers would be liable for dam-
ages incurred by passengers, baggage, or cargo, but fixed a limit
10. Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the War-
saw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 498 (1967).
11. Dana Stanculescu, Recovery for Mental Harm Under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention: An Interpretation of Ltsion Corporelle, 8 HASTINGS INT'L & COjaP. L. REV.
339, 351 (1985).
12. In 1929 the larger aircrafts could carry only 15 to 20 passengers at a cruising
speed of approximately 100 miles per hour for ranges no longer than 500 miles.
Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 498.
13. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 231-34. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin
Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 247 (1984); LAWRENCE B. GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVEN-
TION ANNOTATED: A LEGAL HANDBOOK 285-93 (1988) (listing signatory parties to the War-
saw Convention).
14. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 499-500.
15. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 498-99.
16. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 500.
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on the liability of air carriers at 125,000 French francs (8,300
United States dollars) per person. In Article 20, the burden of
proof was shifted to the air carriers through the establishment of
a rebuttable presumption of negligence. This provision, which
placed the burden on the air carrier to show lack of negligence,
facilitated passenger recovery by relieving passengers of the dif-
ficult burden of proving negligence by the air carrier. 17 Ostensi-
bly, the Warsaw Convention was an attempt to achieve a deli-
cate balance between the drafters' conflicting goals.
The United States did not participate in the drafting of the
Convention; however, the Senate ratified the Treaty on June 15,
1934,18 and the United States officially joined the Treaty later
that year.19 Israel, which became a state in 1948, adopted the
Treaty on October 8, 1949, and was first bound by it on January
6, 1950.20
The Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by the
French delegation, and no official English translation has ever
been internationally recognized.2 An unofficial English transla-
tion, prepared by the United States Department of State, was
presented to the Senate for ratification in 1934.22 Likewise, the
Convention was translated into other languages by other parties
to the convention and these translations were presented to their
respective governments. These translations sometimes gave dif-
ferent meanings to French phrases contained within the Conven-
tion. For example, the German version adopted by Austria, Ger-
many, and Switzerland, translates the phrase "l6sion corporelle"
in Article 17 of the Convention not as "bodily injury" as it ap-
pears in the English translation, but as "infringement on the
health. '23 Because of the disparate phrasing contained in various
17. Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, art. 20.
18. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 502.
19. 78 CONG. REC. 11, 582 (1934).
20. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 791 (Isr. 1984); MANKIEWiZ, supra
note 4, at 232.
21. GEORGETrE MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 5 (1977).
The unofficial English translations of the Warsaw Convention include the Schedule
to the United Kingdom Carriage by Air Act 1932, the Canadian Carriage by Air Act, the
Australian Civil Aviation (Carrier's Liability) Act 1959-1973, and the text ratified by the
United States Senate on June 15, 1934. See id. at 5. Unless otherwise noted, the transla-
tion used in this Comment is the American version.
22. Stanculescu, supra note 11, at 351.
23. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 146.
Otto Reise, the German delegate to the Convention, translated the phrase "lbsion
corporelle" as follows: "und sonstige resundheitsbeschadigung eines Reisenden ent-
1992] 815
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translations, these unofficial translations do not necessarily clar-
ify the precise meaning of ambiguous French phrases that ap-
pear in the text of the Convention.
In the sixty-four years since the adoption of the Warsaw
Convention, the Treaty has been modified by six protocols and
supplemented by one other Convention.2 4 The Warsaw Conven-
tion was first amended by the Hague Protocol" at a diplomatic
conference in September of 1955. The Hague Conference was
convened primarily in order to reconsider the limits on liability
articulated in Article 22 that had received considerable criticism.
With the growth of the industry, the low rate of accidents, and
the availability of liability insurance, many observers felt that
such a low limit on air carrier liability was no longer justified. In
response to these concerns, the drafters of the Protocol in-
creased the limit on liability by one hundred percent to
$16,600.26 Israel adopted the Hague Protocol on November 3,
1964.7 Opponents in the United States Congress, however, were
not mollified by the new provision. Believing that the limit on
liability was still too low, the United States refused to ratify the
Protocol and on November 15, 1965, gave formal notice of de-
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention. 28 A special convention of
contracting states was thereupon called in Montreal in February
1966 for the purpose of finding a solution which would permit
the United States to withdraw its denunciation, scheduled for
May 16, 1966.2"
This solution came in the form of the Montreal Agree-
ment,30 a contract among all the major international air carriers,
in which the air carriers agreed to raise the limit of air carrier
liability to $75,000. Moreover, the drafters of the Montreal
Agreement abolished the negligence standard adhered to by the
standene Schaden zu ersetzen." Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670,
673 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
24. MANKMWICZ, supra note 4, at 6.
25. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague
Protocol].
26. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 6.
27. MANKEWICZ, supra note 4, at 232.
28. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 546-52.
29. MANKimwicz, supra note 4, at 10-11.
30. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, approved by CAB Order No. E-28680, May 13,
1966, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW Doc-
UMENTS 971 (Supp. 1981) [hereinafter Montreal Agreement].
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Warsaw Convention and, in its place, instituted a new policy of
strict liability for damages to passengers, cargo, and baggage.
These revised liability provisions were now required to appear
on passenger tickets so as to provide travellers with notice of the
limits of air carrier liability.3' However, the contractual agree-
ment created by the notice of liability on the passenger ticket
was only applicable when a passenger would make at least one
stop within the United States.3 2 As a result of the new agree-
ment, the United States withdrew its notice of denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention on May 13, 1966.33
Some of the parties to the Warsaw Convention met again in
Guatemala City in 1971; this meeting resulted in the drafting of
the Guatemala City Protocol.3 4 The Guatemala City Protocol
once again raised the fixed limits of air carrier liability - this
time to $100,00025 Moreover, it improved upon and made uni-
versal the strict liability regime established in the Montreal
Agreement .3  Despite their participation in the drafting of the
Protocol, many countries, including the United States, have not
actually ratified it. Therefore, the Protocol is not in effect in the
international arena.37 However, Israel ratified the Guatemala
City Protocol in 1980.38
B. Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention established a cause of
action for passengers whose injuries are sustained as a result of
accidents39 which occur on board an aircraft or in the process of
31. Id.
32. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 597.
33. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 8.
34. Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air as Amended by the Hague Protocol, Mar. 8, 1971, re-
printed in ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAw DOCUMENTS 437 (Supp. 1972) [herein-
after Guatemala City Protocol].
35. MANIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 10.
The Guatemala City Protocol entitles states that are not satisfied with the new limit
of liability for death or personal injury to establish a supplementary system of compen-
sation within their own borders. Moreover, a court may award to the claimant all or part
of his costs provided that the air carrier has refused to settle within a period of six
months after having received the claim. MANKIEWIcZ, supra note 4, at 10.
36. To this end the Guatemala City Protocol deprived the carrier of the exception
provided by Article 20(2) for liability for goods damaged due to error in piloting, naviga-
tion or handling of the aircraft. MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 13.
37. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1501 (1991).
38. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 794 (Isr. 1984).
39. The precise definition of "accidents" as it appears in Article 17 of the Warsaw
1992]
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embarking or disembarking.4 ° Thus, the debate about whether,
under the Warsaw Convention, a passenger can recover damages
for psychic injury caused by an airline accident is focused on the
interpretation of Article 17. The American translation of Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention, which was before the Senate
when it ratified the Convention in 1934, provided that "the car-
rier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
death or wounding of a passenger or any bodily injury suffered
by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sus-
tained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of
the operations of embarking or disembarking." '41 Since the
1970's, this translation has been repeatedly disputed by the
courts in their effort to determine if the original French text al-
lows recovery for mental distress unaccompanied by physical in-
juries. The debate has specifically focused on the translation of
the French words "l6sion corporelle." Some courts have held
that the proper translation of the French phrase is "bodily in-
jury," which would not encompass emotional damages,42 while
Convention has been examined in many cases. In Air France v. Saks, the Supreme Court
held that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if the passen-
ger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to
the passenger. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985) (recovery denied to passenger
who lost her hearing in one ear on a smooth and uneventful flight).
The Court advised that this definition of accident should be flexibly applied to en-
compass more events than what would traditionally have been understood to be acci-
dents. For example, courts have interpreted Article 17 broadly enough to include torts
committed by terrorists or fellow passengers. See Air France, 38 (III) P.D. at 745 (pas-
senger recovers for mental injuries arising out of hijacking incident); Evangelinos v.
Trans World Airline, 550 F.2d. 152 (3d Cir. 1977) (terrorist attack); Day v. Trans World
Airlines, 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 (1976) (terrorist attack);
Krystal v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(hijacking).
Courts have also allowed for recovery under Article 17 in many other situations
which have not traditionally been understood to be accidents. See DeMarines v. KLM,
433 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978) (malfunctioning or
inadequacy of aircraft pressurizing system); Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (rapid descent of the aircraft combined with failure to maintain cabin
pressure); Fleming v. Delta Airlines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (bad weather con-
ditions and turbulence); Kalish v. Trans World Airlines, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1007, 1009 (Civ.
Ct. 1977) (noise, panic, and pandemonium following a hard landing).
40. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 394 (1985).
41. Id. at 397 n.2 (emphasis added).
The original French text of Article 17 reads as follows: "Le transporteur est responsable
du dommage servenu en cas de mort, de blessure, ou de autre lesion corporelle subie par
un voyageur lorsque l'accident qui a caus6 le dommage s'est produit A bord de l'a6rnoef
au cours de toutes operations d'embarquement et de dbarquement." Id.
42. While most courts agree that the phrase "bodily injury" in Article 17 does not
encompass recovery for emotional trauma independent of physical injury, the court in
818
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others have preferred the translation "personal injury," which
could allow recovery for emotional trauma as well as physical
injuries. Both the American and the Israeli Supreme Courts
agree that if translated as "bodily injury," the phrase "lesion
corporelle" would not encompass recovery for purely emotional
damages. However, these two courts disagree as to whether such
a translation is proper or accurate.
C. The Two Cases
The case before the Israeli Supreme Court, Air France v.
Teichner, stemmed from an incident that had outraged people
all over the world. On June 27, 1976, an Air France aircraft was
hijacked en route from Tel-Aviv to Paris.4" The hijackers forced
the pilot to veer from his course and land at the Entebbe Air-
port in Uganda." The passengers were subsequently held at the
airport for several days until they were rescued by Israeli
forces. 45 Six years later, in 1982, passengers brought actions
against Air France to recover damages for the extreme emotional
distress they had suffered.46 One group of passengers filed suit in
the Jerusalem District Court, while another group of passengers
filed in the Tel-Aviv District Court.47 Air France moved for sum-
mary judgment in both cases, claiming that these causes of ac-
tion were barred by the statute of limitations.4 s
Husserl v. Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), held that the
term "bodily injury" could include mental damages because "mental reactions and func-
tions are merely more subtle and less well understood physiological phenomena than the
physiological phenomena associated with the functioning of the tissues and organs and
with physical trauma." Id. at 1250.
When psychological trauma stems from a physical injury sustained by a passenger,
however, it is widely accepted that recovery for both types of injuries is permissible
under Article 17. Sisk, supra note 9, at 134 n.49. One commentator argues that there
need not be any causal link between the emotional distress and the physical injury as
long as they are both present, and both stem out of the same incident. MILLER, supra
note 21, at 121. This approach, however, could produce absurd results. If, for example,
two passengers sitting side by side on an aircraft suffer emotional trauma during an acci-
dent, and one of them breaks an arm, that passenger could recover damages for emo-
tional trauma, while the other one could not.
43. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 788 (Isr. 1984).
44. Id. at 788-89.
45. Id. An American court has dealt with claims arising out of the same set of events
as Teichner. Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 V . Supp. 971, 977
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (purely mental injuries covered by Article 17).
46. Air France, 38 (III) P.D. at 789.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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The Tel-Aviv District Court denied the motion, while the
Jerusalem District Court granted the motion.4 Air France and
the Jerusalem plaintiffs appealed these judgments. ° On appeal,
Air France argued that Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention
does not create a cause of action for purely psychic injuries and,
alternatively, that the cause of action was barred by the statute
of limitations in Article 29.51 The Israeli Supreme Court consoli-
dated the two appeals and held that Article 17 permits recovery
for emotional distress damages, but that the actions were barred
by the statute of limitations.52  Nonetheless, in the last para-
graph of its opinion, the Court encouraged Air France to com-
pensate the passengers. 3
The case before the Supreme Court of the United States,
Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, was based on an entirely different set
of facts. On May 5, 1983, during a flight from Miami to Nassau,
Bahamas, all three of the airplane's engines failed. The plane
began to lose altitude quickly, and the passengers were informed
that the plane was about to crash into the ocean. 4 After this
announcement, the pilot was able to restart one of the engines
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 806, 808. The Israeli Supreme Court decided the issue of recovery of dam-
ages for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury before embarking upon its
discussion of the limitations on recovery set forth by Article 29. The Court held that
under Article 29, the plaintiffs are barred from pursuing the cause of action available to
them under Article 17. Id. at 808.
Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
(1) The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought
within 2 years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the
date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the
transportation stopped.
(2) The method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by
the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
The Israeli Court dealt with the issue of whether the two year limit set forth in
Article 29(1) is determinative or whether, under Article 29(2), courts can use local stat-
utes of limitations to extend that two year limit. In deciding this issue, the Court ex-
amined the negotiating history and goals of the Convention, as well as the treatment of
this issue in French, American and British courts. The Court concluded that Article
29(2) was not intended to allow for an extension of the two year period set forth in
Article 29(1), but only to allow courts to utilize local laws in resolving technical questions
about the calculation of the two year period. Therefore, the two year statute of limita-
tions set forth in Article 29(1) was found to be applicable to the plaintiffs at bar and
prevented their recovery. Air France, 38 (III) P.D. at 802-08; for an extensive discussion
of the interpretation of Article 29 see MILLER, supra note 21, at 310-29.
53. Air France, 38 (III) P.D. at 808.
54. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1492 (1991).
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and land the aircraft safely in Miami.5 Several of the passengers
on this flight brought suit against Eastern Airlines in the South-
ern District Court of Florida to recover damages for the emo-
tional trauma they had experienced. The District Court dis-
missed the complaint on the grounds that emotional distress
unaccompanied by physical injury is not compensable under Ar-
ticle 17.56 After examining the history of the Warsaw Convention
and the French legal meaning of the phrase "lesion corporelle,"
the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal.57
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among lower courts and reversed the judgment of the Eleventh
Circuit, holding that Article 17 does not provide recovery for
purely psychic injuries. 8
III. THE U.S. VERSUS THE ISRAELI APPROACH: INTERPRETATION
OF ARTICLE 17 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
A. The Interpretation of Treaties
In applying Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention to similar
causes of action, the Israeli Supreme Court and the United
States Supreme Court took completely different approaches to
the role of the courts in the interpretation of treaties. The Israeli
Supreme Court contended that the plain meaning of the treaty
must be adaptable to the current conditions of both the aircraft
industry and international law.59 Thus, the Israeli Court main-
tained that a new examination of the goals of the Convention is
necessary in light of the practical exigencies of air travel today
and the development of the law in most countries towards ac-
ceptance of emotional damages independent of physical injury. 0
If the Convention was not interpreted in this way, the Israeli
Court contended that the Convention would become stagnant
and useless in the face of modern reality." The Israeli Supreme
Court did not explain, however, how recovery for purely psychic
injuries under Article 17 is better suited to the current legal and
55. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1466 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1489 (1991).
56. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 307, 314 (S.D. Fla. 1986), rev'd, 872
F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
57. Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1480.
58. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1493 (1991).
59. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 800 (Isr. 1984).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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economic climate.
The United States Supreme Court overtly rejected the Is-
raeli approach and followed the accepted approach that the
evolution of the law must be left up to the parties to the Con-
vention and not to the individual courts.6 2 According to this ap-
proach, a court has an obligation to keep a treaty's interpreta-
tion as close as possible to the intent of its framers.6 3 The court's
obligation stems from the fact that a treaty is an agreement be-
tween states which is binding on the parties to the treaty until
they deliberately modify it multilaterally.6 4 Indeed, treaties are
not even altered by subsequent inconsistent custom of the par-
ties unless there is evidence that by their actions the parties in-
tended to alter the meaning of the treaty. 5 It is, therefore, the
intention of the parties that is paramount. Thus, judicial inter-
pretation of a treaty is limited to decisions which are not incon-
sistent with the intent of the parties to the treaty.6 Indeed, if
the courts of the different parties to the Convention deliberafely
choose to ignore the intent of the Convention's drafters and in-
stead interpret the Convention according to their own policy
considerations, the entire raison d'etre of the Convention as a
binding agreement creating uniformity among its parties would
be frustrated. Accordingly, a court must interpret the Warsaw
Convention in light of the intentions of the parties.
Several principles of treaty interpretation that provide guid-
ance as to how the intent of the parties can be surmised by the
courts have been codified in Articles 31, 32, and 33 of the Vienna
Convention 7 and are now internationally accepted. Articles 31
and 32 instruct courts interpreting ambiguous treaty clauses to
examine the negotiating history of a treaty and the subsequent
agreements of the parties.6 Article 33 specifically addresses the
62. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1502.
63. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 905 (1968).
64. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 69 (1987).
65. Id.
66. Jesse Lewis Case, (U.S. v. Gr. Brit.), 6 R.I.A.A. 85, 90 (1921) (claims arbitration
under special agreement).
67. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
68. Article 31 provides that, wherever possible, treaties should be interpreted con-
sidering only the text of the treaty, any supplementary agreements and instruments,
subsequent agreements or practices, and the applicable rules of international law. If the
interpretation still leaves the meaning of the treaty ambiguous or obscure, Article 32
allows for supplementary means of interpretation such as preparatory work on the treaty
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problem of language in treaty interpretation. Article 33 provides
that the original language text is authoritative and that any
translations of the treaty into other languages will be considered
authentic only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree. 9
Therefore, when a treaty is drafted in only one language, that
language is controlling in the resolution of any disputes that
arise out of the treaty.70 There are two important justifications
for relying primarily on the original language of the treaty. First,
since the treaty was negotiated only in the official language, if
there are any discrepancies in the translations, it is only this of-
ficial language that accurately reflects the intent of the parties.7 1
Second, if different countries rely on the translation of the
treaty into their own languages, the uniformity of the interpreta-
tion might be compromised. A danger exists that a country rely-
ing only upon its translation of a multilingual treaty would in-
advertantly be violating some of the terms of the treaty and the
reasonable expectations of the other parties.72 Therefore, it is
important to defer to the official French text of the Warsaw
Convention, and not to the English, German or any other trans-
lation, in order to determine if Article 17 allows for recovery of
purely psychic injuries.
The rules of treaty interpretation codified by the Vienna
Convention have been confirmed and developed in decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States. In interpreting Article
17, the Supreme Court in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd used the
method of treaty interpretation developed in Air France v. Saks,
an earlier Court decision interpreting the Warsaw Convention.7 3
Although it did not cite the American decision, the Israeli Su-
preme Court followed the same method of treaty interpretation
in Air France v. Teichner.4 In the earlier decision, Air France v.
Saks, the United States Supreme Court held that when inter-
preting a treaty, the Court must first turn to the text of the
and the circumstances of its conclusion. Id. arts. 31, 32.
69. Id. art. 33.
70. Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449, 453-54 (1930) (the term "fonds et
biens" in a treaty drafted in French had been accurately translated as "goods and ef-
fects," but the Supreme Court found that the civil-law usage of "biens" included real
estate, whereas "goods" under United States common law referred only to chattels).
71. Stanculescu, supra note 11, at 343-44.
72. Stanculescu, supra note 11, at 344.
73. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1493 (1991).
74. 38 (III) P.D. 785, 798-801 (Isr. 1984).
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treaty and place it in the context in which the words are used."
In accordance with Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention,
when the meaning of the treaty is still ambiguous, the Court
may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty,
the negotiations, and the practical constructions adopted by the
parties.7 6 Moreover, the Court held that when interpreting the
Warsaw Convention, which was drafted by continental jurists,
the Court must consider the "French legal meaning" of the text
in order to surmise the intent of the drafters.7 7 The Court rea-
soned that only through an investigation of the French legal
meaning of the text is it possible to comprehend the meaning
that the French terms held for the drafters and thereby deter-
mine the shared expectations of the parties. 8 Therefore, in in-
terpreting the phrase "l6sion corporelle" as it appears in Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention, it is important to examine French
tort law so as to understand the intent of the Convention
drafters.
In sum, the United States Supreme Court and the Israeli
Supreme Court agreed that in order to decide if plaintiffs may
recover damages for purely psychic injuries under the Warsaw
Convention, a court must interpret the French phrase "lesion
corporelle" in the official text of Article 17. Since the meaning of
the phrase is unclear, both Courts attempted to discern the in-
tent of the parties by examining the French legal meaning of
"lesion corporelle," the legislative history of Article 17, and the
effect of subsequent agreements by the parties on the Article.
B. The French Legal Meaning of "Lsion Corporelle"
Although the Israeli Supreme Court in Air France v. Teich-
ner, and the United States Supreme Court in Eastern Airlines
v. Floyd, both agreed that the French legal meaning of the
phrase "l6sion corporelle" is important to the interpretation of
the scope of air carrier liability under Article 17, the two courts
reached opposing conclusions as to what that French legal mean-
ing is. This discrepancy could be attributed to the different ap-
proaches each Court took in its analysis of the French legal
meaning of "l6sion corporelle." The Israeli Supreme Court fo-
75. 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985).
76. Id. at 396.
77. Id. at 399.
78. Id.
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cused on the fact that French tort law, at the time the Warsaw
Convention was drafted, generally allowed recovery for mental
damages unaccompanied by physical injuries. The United States
Supreme Court, on the other hand, chose to focus specifically on
the precise meaning of the phrase "lesion corporelle" within
French tort law, rather than on the general precepts of this body
of law. However, in examining the French legal meaning of the
phrase "lesion corporelle," it is important to explore both
Courts' approaches, as well as the independent meaning of each
component of the phrase in French legal history.
The Israeli Supreme Court focused its analysis of the
French legal meaning of "lesion corporelle" on the fact that re-
covery for purely psychic damages was allowed in French tort
law at the time the Warsaw Convention was drafted. While ad-
mitting that the French legal meaning of "l6sion corporelle" is
inconclusive, the Court concluded that given the broad scope of
recovery under French law in 1929, there is no reason to believe
that the French drafters meant to exclude purely psychic dam-
ages from the scope of recovery allowed under Article 17 .7 As
the Israeli Supreme Court asserted, French law in 1929 had rec-
ognized the right to recover solely for mental anguish. Claimants
were allowed to recover for such damages as injury to honor aris-
ing from adultery and emotional distress resulting from the
death of a stepmother.8 0 All that was required in French law for
the recovery of mental damages was that the damage sustained
was immediate, certain and direct."1 Accordingly, it has been ar-
gued that inclusion of mental damages in Article 17 would be
consistent with the French drafters' expectations based on their
domestic civil law.2
However, as the Supreme Court of the United States points.
out, the domestic law of most of the other parties to the Warsaw
Convention did not recognize recovery based on purely psychic
damages until many years after the Convention was drafted.8 3
Indeed, many states in the United States still do not recognize
such recovery today. 4 The United States Supreme Court argued
79. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (I1) P.D. 785 (Isr. 1984).
80. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1472 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1489 (1991).
81. MILLER, supra note 21, at 112.
82. MILLER, supra note 21, at 126.
83. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1498 (1991).
84. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (Wade
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that because of this fact, if the drafters intended to include
purely mental injuries in their recovery scheme, they would have
felt compelled to do so unequivocally. 5 At the very least, given
that the French drafters' expectations under French law
squarely conflicted with the expectations of drafters from other
countries, one would assume that had the parties considered
psychic injury to be a possibility in aircraft accidents, they
would have engaged in significant negotiations on the issue of
recovery for emotional damages. However, the issue of recovery
for purely psychic injuries was not mentioned at the Warsaw
Convention.86 Thus, despite the fact that French law recognized
mental injuries as compensable in certain situations, it is un-
likely that the French drafters specifically intended to apply this
precept to aircraft accidents under the Warsaw Convention.
In its analysis of the French legal meaning of the phrase
"l6sion corporelle," the United States Supreme Court focused on
the precise meaning of the phrase within French tort law, rather
than on the general precepts of French law. The Court found
that no French legislative provision, case, treatise or scholarly
writing prior to 1929 ever used the phrase "l6sion corporelle."
Although subsequent court decisions did use the phrase when
referring to physical injuries caused by automobile accidents,
such decisions do not necessarily reflect the contracting parties'
understanding of the term because they were decided well after
the drafting of the Warsaw Convention. Based on the absence of
the term "16sion corporelle" in all French legal texts in 1929, the
Supreme Court concluded that the fact that French tort law
generally allowed for recovery of purely emotional damages does
not mean that the phrase "lesion corporelle," as it appears in
Article 17, was specifically intended to incorporate recovery for
mental injuries.8
The appellate court also examined the precise meaning of
"16sion corporelle," but argued that, in the context of Article 17,
the term "lesion corporelle" does not connote physical injury in
the traditional sense. The Eleventh Circuit, in Floyd v. Eastern
Airlines, proposed that the wording of Article 17 strongly sug-
gests that the drafters did not intend to limit liability to a par-
Keeton ed., 1984).
85. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1498-99.
86. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (HI) P.D. 785, 800 (Isr. 1984).
87. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1494-96.
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ticular category of damages.8 The court examined the phrase
"[1]e transporteur est responsable du dommage servenu en cas
de mort, de blessure, ou de autre lesion corporelle . . ." as it
appears in Article 17. Based on this wording, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit argued that the drafters of the Convention would not have
mentioned one specific physical injury such as "blessure"
(wounding) if they had intended "lesion corporelle" to refer only
to physical injuries.89 The court contended that to specify "bles-
sure" as an injury upon which recovery could be claimed would
be redundant if the phrase "l6sion corporelle" was meant to be
restricted to physical injuries.8 0 However, the Supreme Court
has pointed out that, while the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation
is consistent with domestic statutory construction, it is equally
plausible that by their use of the word "blessure," the drafters
of the Warsaw Convention referred to injuries where a person's
skin is actually broken and that "l6sion corporelle" was meant to
include all other physical injuries, such as internal bleeding,
smoke inhalation, or oxygen deprivation.9 1 Therefore, the con-
text of the phrase "lesion corporelle'! within Article 17 is not, in
itself, sufficient to allow the conclusion that the Warsaw Con-
vention drafters intended the phrase to encompass recovery for
psychic damages unaccompanied by physical injury.
In its interpretation of the language of Article 17, the Su-
preme Court of the United States also found it helpful to com-
pare the language of Article 17 with the similar language of an-
other treaty drafted in French - the Berne Convention on
International Rail Transport (Berne Convention).9 2 In its origi-
nal draft in 1952, the Berne Convention allowed recovery for "la
mort, les blessures ou de toute autre atteinte, A l'int~grit6
corporglle." 3 This language closely parallels the language of Ar-
ticle 17 of the Warsaw Convention which allows recovery for
"mort, de blessure, ou de autre lesion corporelle." The final re-
sult of the Berne Convention, however, was modified in 1966 by
the addition of the words "ou mentale," and only then did it
88. Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1472 (l1th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 1489 (1991).
89. Id. at 1472-73.
90. Id.
91. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1496.
92. Id. at 1499.
93. Id.
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allow for emotional damages."4 Article 17, on the other hand,
was never modified to achieve the same result. The Supreme
Court used this analogy to conclude that when parties to a con-
vention intend to allow for recovery for purely psychic injuries,
they do so unequivocally. 5 Of course, it could be argued that the
modification of the Berne Convention did not create a new cause
of action, but rather clarified a cause of action that was already
contained, albeit in a less than clear fashion, in the original Con-
vention itself. This argument contends that the Berne Conven-
tion modification did not change the scope of recovery, but
rather made the drafters' intentions regarding recovery less am-
biguous. Under this argument, as applied to the Warsaw Con-
vention, the cause of action for emotional damages may already
be encompassed by Article 17, even though the terms of Article
17 suffer from a similar lack of clarity.
While the Supreme Court did not specifically contend with
this argument, such an omission does not necessarily weaken the
Court's analogy. Even if the modifications to the Berne Conven-
tion were intended to clarify pre-existing intent, the drafters of
the Berne Convention evidently recognized that without this
modification, their intention was unintelligible and that courts
would not have necessarily allowed recovery for purely psychic
injuries. Similarly, without a comparable clarification of the
Warsaw Convention, courts cannot possibly discern that the
drafters intended Article 17 to encompass recovery for purely
psychic injuries. Therefore, if the drafters of the Warsaw Con-
vention in fact intended Article 17 to encompass liability for
purely emotional damages, they would have made their inten-
tions as unambiguous as did the drafters of the Berne
Convention.
While the United States Supreme Court did not examine
the words "lesion" and "corporelle" as they separately appeared
in French discussions of damages, it is nonetheless important to
do so in order to understand the meaning of the phrase "lesion
94. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (D.N.M. 1973). The
relevant portion of the Berne Convention now reads: "Le Chemin de fer est responsable
des dommages resultant de la mort, des blessures ou de toute autre atteinte a l'integrite
physique ou mentale d'un voyageur ...... Id. at 1157-58. The English translation reads
as follows: "The railroad is liable for damages resulting from the death, wounds, or any
other infringement of the physical or mental integrity of a passenger. . . ." Id. at 1158
(citing Henry P. de Vries, translation in JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
7173 (July 4, 1973)).
95. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1499.
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corporelle" within the context of Article 17. The basic forms of
damages in French law are "dommage materiel" (pecuniary
losses) and "dommage moral" (non-pecuniary losses, including
emotional distress). 8 The term "corporelle" is occasionally used
in personal injury cases to encompass damages for physical pain
and mutilation and appears to serve as a composite of "dom-
mage mat6riel" and "dommage moral. ' 97  Thus, the word
"corporelle" in itself does not automatically exclude mental
damages.9 8 The use of the term "lesion," on the other hand, con-
notes that a physical injury has occurred. Although the term "16-
sion" is used as a term of art in French contract law to mean
"just price requirement," there is no indication that it is a legal
term of art when used in conjunction with the word
"corporelle." 99 Indeed, in the context of Article 17, where the
term is used to supplement the words death and wounding, the
phrase "lsion corporelle" undoubtedly corresponds to the class-
ical definition of the term as an injury to an "organ."100 There-
fore, although the word "corporelle" alone could be interpreted
to include psychic injury, the coupling of word "corporele" with
the word "16sion" in Article 17 suggests that the phrase was not
intended to include recovery for psychic injury.10 1
Although at the time the Convention was drafted French
tort law generally permitted recovery for purely psychic dam-
ages, an examination of the specific phrase "16sion corporelle" in
French tort law indicates that the phrase relates most closely to
a physical, rather than emotional injury. Furthermore, an analy-
sis of the framers' application of these terms in the context of
Article 17, as well as a comparison to the construction of the
96. MILLER, supra note 21, at 112.
97. MILLER, supra note 21, at 112-13.
98. MILLER, supra note 21, at 114.
99. Sisk, supra note 9, at 137.
100. MILLER, supra note 21, at 127-28.
101. In a dissertation written under the supervision of Georges Ripert, a leading
French delegate to the Warsaw Convention, the author argues that: "The use of the
expression "lfsion" after the words "death" and "wounding" encompasses and contem-
plates cases of traumatism and nervous troubles, the consequences of which do not im-
mediately become manifest in the organism but which can be related to the accident."
MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 146 (citing YVONNE BLANc-DANNERY, LA CONVENTION DE
VARSOVIE ET LES RGLES DU TRANSPORT AIRIEN INTERNATIONAL 62 (1933)). But none of the
cases that cite this proposition reveal any sources of French interpretation which support
this view. See Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462, 1472 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991); Palagonia v. Trans World Airlines, 442 N.Y.S.2d 670, 673 (Sup.
Ct. 1978).
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comparable Berne Convention, give no indication that the draft-
ers would have intended to allow for this type of recovery under
the Warsaw Convention without providing for it explicitly.
C. Legislative History
The United States Supreme Court decision in Air France v.
Saks noted that since the text of Article 17 is ambiguous, it is
important to examine the negotiations that culminated in the
Convention in order to determine the intent of its drafters. 102
Unfortunately, the question of air carrier liability for emotional
trauma was not directly addressed at the Warsaw Convention. 103
In the Paris Conference of 1925, the delegates drafted a broad
statement of liability that did not specify particular types of in-
juries. 10 4 The proposed article merely said that "the carrier is
liable for accidents, losses, damages to goods and delays. 1 0 5
Thus, if an accident were to occur, it could be argued that the
above language would permit recovery for both physical injuries
and emotional distress.106However, at the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the drafters
provided that the carrier would be liable "in the case of death,
wounding, or any other 'l6sion corporelle' suffered by the travel-
ler. 10 7 In response to this revision, the Israeli Supreme Court in
Air France v. Teichner, and the Eleventh Circuit in Floyd v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., took the approach that, since the minutes
of the Warsaw Conference contain no explicit statement that the
revised protocol was intended to foreclose recovery for a certain
type of injury, it would be unfair to infer that the drafters in-
tended to bar recovery for emotional distress claims.10 s
102. 470 U.s. 392, 400 (1985).
103. Floyd, 872 F.2d at 1473.
104. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 401 (1985).
105. Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, 368 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (D.N.M. 1973) (quot-
ing Article 5 of the Convention Draft, Conference Internationale de Droit Priv6 Afrien,
1926, Ministhre des Affaires Etrang~res 41-42, Series C. (79)). The original French text
reads as follows: "Le transporteur est responsable des accidents, pertes, avaries et
retards." Id.
106. Burnett, 368 F. Supp. at 1157.
107. Id. (citing International Conference on Air Law Affecting Air Questions, Min-
utes, Second International Conference on Private Aeronautical Law, October 4-12 1929,
at 59 (R. Homer & D. Legrez trans., 1975)).
The original French text reads: "en cas de mort, de blessure ou de toute autre l6sion
corporelle subie par un voyageur." Id.
108. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 800 (Isr. 1984); Floyd v. Eastern Air-
lines, 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
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The Supreme Court of the United States came to the oppo-
site conclusion, namely that narrowing the language from unlim-
ited types of injuries to specific injuries implies that the drafters
did intend to limit the scope of air carrier liability to exclude
recovery for purely mental injuries."0 ' According to the Supreme
Court's approach, the addition of new, restrictive language can-
not be ignored by simply asserting that it fails to demonstrate
any intention of the drafters to limit the liability of air carri-
ers.110 However, the Supreme Court's reasoning on this issue di-
rectly conflicts with arguments it makes in other parts of its
opinion. More specifically, the Supreme Court expressly asserted
in its opinion that, unless a drafting change is accompanied by a
clear statement which evinces the drafters' intent to substan-
tively modify the Convention, no such intent should be in-
ferred.1 Thus, the Supreme Court's position appeared to be
that any drafting changes unaccompanied by a clear expression
of intent should not be interpreted as to create any substantive
change in the scope of recovery. While the Court conveyed this
position in relation to drafting changes that occurred subse-
quent to the Warsaw Convention, this assertion is equally appli-
cable to any drafting changes occurred prior to the Convention's
ratification. Applying the Court's assertion to the drafting
change which occurred between the Paris Conference of 1925
and the Warsaw Convention of 1929, the Supreme Court should
have concluded that, since no clear expression of intent was
evinced, the revision of later drafts provides no clear evidence
that the drafters intended a narrowing of the scope of recovery.
Even given such a concession by the Court, the Court would
still have been free to argue that the drafting changes certainly
did not suggest any intent to allow for such recovery either. In-
deed, even if the additional language had been incorporated into
the Warsaw Convention in 1929 for the purpose of clarification
109. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1497 (1991); see also Burnett,
368 F. Supp. at 1158.
110. Sisk, supra note 9, at 143. See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 700-01 (1988) (noting significance of change in negotiating history
of Hague Service Convention from less precise term in draft to more precise term in final
treaty provision); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985) (finding that a change
from an early draft of the Warsaw Convention suggested an intentional change of
meaning).
111. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1500. See also infra text accompanying
notes 120-24.
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rather than to narrow the scope of recovery, 112 such a drafting
change would have provided the drafters with an opportunity to
clarify any intent they might have had to allow for recovery of
psychic damages. The fact that the drafters failed to utilize this
opportunity to provide specifically for such recovery provides
ample evidence that recovery for psychic injury was not a major
concern of the drafters at that time. Thus, in itself, the drafting
change between the Paris Conference and the Warsaw Conven-
tion provides no clear evidence of intent either to include or to
exclude emotional distress damages.
Further supporting the assertion that the drafters possessed
no intent whatsoever regarding recovery for psychic injury is the
fact that the drafters at Warsaw never discussed the issue of
emotional distress damages. This omission implies that the
drafters did not consciously intend to allow for such recovery.
The Israeli and the United States Supreme Courts both sug-
gested that the reason that there was no mention of purely
psychic injuries in the legislative history of the Warsaw Conven-
tion may be that the drafters did not foresee the occurrence of
mental damages that did not arise out of physical injury in air-
plane crashes.113 Since the aviation industry was in its infancy
when the Convention was drafted, it is possible that the drafters
could not envision an aircraft accident that would not cause ex-
tensive physical damage. If the drafters did not foresee the oc-
currence of purely psychic injuries, they certainly could not have
specifically intended to allow for recovery for such injuries.
Moreover, as discussed above,' 4 if purely psychic injuries were
contemplated, there would have been a vigorous debate on the
subject of recovery between countries whose legal tradition al-
lowed for such recovery and those countries whose tradition pro-
hibited it. Indeed, given such disparate expectations on the part
of various signatories, it is certain that these signatories would
not have come to a silent agreement that psychic injury was to
be a compensable damage under Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention.
112. MILLER, supra note 21, at 125.
113. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1498; Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D.
785, 800 (Isr. 1984).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
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D. Subsequent Agreements of the Parties
In Air France v. Saks, the Supreme Court of the United
States advised courts interpreting the Warsaw Convention to ex-
amine the practical constructions adopted by the parties. 115 In
reaching its decision in Air France v. Teichner, the Israeli Su-
preme Court relied heavily on the subsequent agreements of the
contracting parties to the Warsaw Convention. 116 The Israeli ar-
gument focused on the fact that the authentic English transla-
tions of the Hague Protocol of 1955,1" the Montreal Agreement
of 1966, and the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971,118 all referred
to "lesion corporelle" as "personal injury" instead of "bodily in-
jury." 119 However, in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, the Supreme
Court of the United States contended that none of these agree-
ments worked to redefine "16sion corporelle.' ' 120 Despite its pre-
vious assertions to the contrary,' 2 ' the Court asserted that be-
cause of the lack of clearly articulated intent to effect a change
in, or to clarify, the meaning of the phrase "16sion corporelle," it
was impossible to infer an intent to do so in these protocols. 122
Moreover, the Court argued that the changes in the translation
of "lesion corporelle" in the Hague Protocol and the Guatemala
City Protocol are particularly not dispositive. Both protocols, al-
though they have been adopted by Israel, have not been ratified
by the United States and have not taken effect internation-
ally.123 Therefore, the Court contended that courts are not
bound to apply to the Warsaw Convention the change in the En-
glish translation of the phrase "l6sion corporelle" from "bodily
injury" to "personal injury" in the Hague and Guatemala City
Protocols. 124
115. 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985).
116. Air France, 38 (III) P.D. at 795, 801.
117. "[T]he authentic English text of Article 3(1)(c), as amended at the Hague, uses
the expression 'personal injury' while the original French text retains the expression 'l-
sion corporelle.'" MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 141.
118. The Guatemala City Protocol changed the English translation from "death,
wounding or bodily injury" to "death or personal injury" and eliminated the French
word "blessure" (wounding) from the French text. The revised French text reads: "la
mort ou la l6sion corporelle." MANKIEWICZ, supra note 4, at 141.
119. Air France, 38 (1I1) P.D. at 801; Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 872 F.2d 1462,
1474-75 (11th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1489 (1991).
120. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1500 (1991).
121. Id. at 1497. See also supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
122. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1500.
123. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 403 (1985).
124. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1500-01.
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In specifically discussing the impact of the drafting change
in the Montreal Agreement, the United States Supreme Court
asserted that the Montreal Agreement was intended only to in-
crease the monetary limit on liability and to waive the due care
defense of air carriers. 12 The Montreal Agreement did not "pur-
port to amend the Warsaw Convention. '126 As the New York
Court of Appeals asserted in Rosman v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., the Montreal Agreement modified the effect of the Warsaw
Convention only to the extent of providing for absolute liability
up to $75,000; it did not change the substance of that liability -
i.e., the character of the compensable injuries - as it is provided
in article 17 of the Convention. 127 The United States Supreme
Court also contended that the Montreal Agreement did not re-
present the intent of the signatories of the Warsaw Convention
because it was not a treaty, but rather a contractual agreement
between all major international air carriers.1 28
The passenger notice requirement mandated by the Mon-
treal Agreement, which was designed to give passengers notice of
the limited liability provisions of the Convention, used the
words "personal injury. "129 However, the United States delegate
to Montreal has since declared that the changes made in the
wordings on the ticket booklet did not have any legal signifi-
cance because the scope of liability covered under Article 17 was
not discussed in Montreal. 130 It could be argued that, based on
principles of equity, courts should allow for recovery of emo-
tional damages despite the fact that the language on the ticket
booklet is not legally binding. Since the ticket is the only notice
that passengers are likely to receive regarding the limits imposed
under the Warsaw Convention, passengers will be misled to be-
lieve that they may be able to recover for psychic injuries. 131
But, regardless of this inequity, the courts are not free to alter
the liability scheme agreed upon by the parties to the Conven-
125. Id.
126. Chan v. Korean Airlines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 150 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
127. 358 N.Y.S.2d 97, 102, 314 N.E.2d 848, 851 (Ct. App. 1974).
128. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1501.
129. Montreal Agreement, supra note 30, at 972.
130. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Warsaw, and the Problem of Psychic
Trauma, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 345, 347 (1973).
131. Krystal v. British Overseas Airways, 403 F. Supp. 1322 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (issue
of notice on passenger tickets was dispositive on the finding that Article 17 encompasses
liability for psychic damages).
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tion. As Justice Story said, judges "are not at liberty to dispense
with any of the conditions or requirements of the treaty, or take
away any qualification or integral part of the stipulation, upon
any notion of equity or general inconvenience, or substantial jus-
tice."' 32 Therefore, despite possible misunderstanding by pas-
sengers, courts are not at liberty to allow recovery, for purely
psychic damages without a showing of intent by the drafters of
the Montreal Agreement to broaden the scope of liability under
Article 17.
According to the Israeli Court, the change in the translation
of "16sion corporelle" in the later protocols was not instituted to
alter the original meaning of the term under the Warsaw Con-
vention, but rather to clarify the scope of liability under Article
17.133 The Court asserted that this clarification was necessary in
light of the disputes which had arisen over the years as to the
precise interpretation of the phrase."" In support of this argu-
ment, the Israeli Court noted that there was no record of any
reaction by the drafting committee of the Montreal Agreement
when the chairman presented this change to the committee. 3 5
The Court concluded, therefore, that the Drafting Committee of
the Conference considered "personal injury" to be the correct
translation of the term "lesion corporelle." However, in light of
the previous disputes as to the meaning of the phrase "lesion
corporelle," the fact that no discussion ensued when the change
of the English translation was presented suggests that the draft-
ers did not consider this to be a clarification of the term "lesion
corporelle."' 13 Presumably, a clarification which would resolve a
long disputed question would not be accepted without any
debate.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court of the United States notes,
while the drafters of the protocols considered only the English
version of the Convention, several proposed modifications of the
French text of Article 17 have been raised, but never adopted.1
7
132. The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1821).
133. Air France v. Teichner, 38 (III) P.D. 785, 795 (Isr. 1984).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. In the years preceding the protocols to the Convention, scholars have disagreed
about whether Article 17 encompasses liability for purely psychic damages. Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1499 (1991). Moreover, a proposed revision to Article
17, which would definitely allow for the recovery of purely psychic damages, met with
opposition in Madrid in 1951. Id. See also infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
137. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1499-1501.
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In 1951, a committee representing twenty signatories to the Con-
vention, the Legal Committee of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, met in Madrid and considered an amendment to
the Convention which would expressly allow for recovery of
psychic damages. 18 The Committee tentatively approved a pro-
posal to replace the word "lesion" with the word "affection" in
the French text of Article 17. The United States delegate op-
posed the proposed change because it would expand recovery
under Article 17 to include "mental injury or emotional distur-
bances or upsets which were not connected with or the result of
bodily injury."' 39 The Committee never completed the proposed
revision of Article 17, and the proposal to substitute "affection"
for "lesion" was not adopted. 40 Likewise, during the Interna-
tional Conference on Private Aviation Law held in 1955, a pro-
posal to add the word "mentale" to Article 17 of the Warsaw
Convention so as to allow recovery for purely psychic injuries
was also rejected.'41
As the Supreme Court of the United States has argued, the
fact that the parties to the Convention considered revising the
Convention to include recovery for psychic damages suggests
that they did not believe that Article 17 provided for such recov-
ery. 42 Indeed, it is unlikely that the parties were merely propos-
ing clarification of their original intent by substituting "affec-
tion" for "lesion" because, if that was the case, the proposal
would not have been rejected once the possibility of conflicting
interpretations was recognized. In light of this opposition, it is
improbable that, in using the English phrase "personal injury"
in subsequent protocols, the drafters were attempting to clarify
their original intent that the phrase "lesion corporelle" would
encompass emotional distress. If the parties to the Convention
believed that the language in Article 17 should not have a dis-
tinctly physical scope, they would have chosen to amend the
Convention to allow for recovery for other types of injuries.
138. Sisk, supra note 9, at 144.
139. Sisk, supra note 9, at 144 n.126 (citing Excerpts from the Report of U.S. Dele-
gation to Eighth Session of the Legal Committee of International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation held at Madrid, Spain, Sept. 1951, reprinted in 19 J. AIR L. & CoM. 70, 79 (1952)).
The French delegate, who proposed the change, explained that the change was nec-
essary because Article 17 "presupposed a rupture in the tissue, or a dissolution in con-
tinuity" while the proposed change would allow for recovery for "mental illness." Id.
140. Sisk, supra note 9, at 144 n.126.
141. Sisk, supra note 9, at 144.
142. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1500 (1991).
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IV. THE GOALS OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION DRAFTERS
Since the prior and subsequent history of Article 17 is not
dispositive on the interpretation of "lesion corporelle," it is im-
portant to examine the American and the Israeli decisions in
light of the goals of the drafters of the Convention. In drafting
the treaty, the participants of the Warsaw Convention at-
tempted to balance three distinct objectives: first, to limit the
potential liability of international air carriers in case of acci-
dents; second, to establish a uniform system of rules to govern
the rights and liabilities of air carriers; and third, to ensure that
passengers, who would naturally have difficulty proving that the
air carrier did not use all the necessary precautions to avoid ac-
cidents, would nonetheless be able to recover damages from the
air carriers.'4" The delicate balance among these three objectives
is disturbed by a broad interpretation of Article 17 that gives
disproportional weight to the drafters' third goal.
The drafters' first goal, to limit the liability of air carriers so
as to encourage the growth of the commercial aviation industry,
was their most important consideration. 4 4 In denying recovery
for psychic damages under Article 17, the United States Su-
preme Court asserted that it was conforming to this primary
purpose of the Convention. 145 The Court supported its argument
by pointing out that, in order to further this goal, the drafters of
the Convention chose to limit the scope of air carrier liability to
$8,300, which was low even in 1929.11 The Court contended that
the parties to the Convention were more concerned with ena-
bling airlines to attract investors who might be scared away by
the potential of high liability, than with providing full recovery
to passengers. 147 Indeed, in transmitting the Convention to the
United States Senate in 1934, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
wrote:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not
only be beneficial to passengers and shippers as affording a
143. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 498-500.
144. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 256
(1984); Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 499 ("The second goal - clearly
recognized to be the more important one - was to limit the potential liability of the
carrier in case of an accident.")
145. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1499.
146. Id.; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 498-99.
147. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1499; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note
10, at 499.
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more definite basis of recovery and as tending to lessen litiga-
tions, but that it will prove to be an aid in the development of
international air transportation, as such limitation will afford
the carrier a more definite and equitable basis on which to ob-
tain insurance rates, with the probable result that there would
eventually be a reduction of operating expenses for the carrier
and advantages to travelers and shippers in the way of reduced
transportation charges.148
The Supreme Court was correct in its assertion that the
framers' intent to limit the liability of air carriers is frustrated
by the expansion of the scope of liability to include emotional
distress unaccompanied by physical injury.149 Presumably, this
expansion of liability would encourage widespread litigation by
passengers who have suffered emotional trauma while travelling
on an aircraft and significantly increase the workload of the
courts. 1 0 In light of the court's liberal interpretation of the
phrase "accidents"' 15' and the strict liability standard that air
carriers are held to under the Montreal Agreement,5 2 passengers
who suffered a terrible fright as a result of minor aircraft mal-
functions might then be able to recover from the air carrier. 153
Moreover, it is almost impossible to predict the frequency or
scope of emotional injuries which may afflict particularly sensi-
tive passengers as a result of getting caught in heavy turbulence
or experiencing a rough landing.154 This uncertainty would un-
doubtedly lead to higher insurance premiums for air carriers.
Therefore, under a broad interpretation of "lesion corporelle,"
the already high liability insurance that airlines pay today would
rise significantly because of the expanded scope of liability. That
cost would inevitably be passed to the passengers through higher
148. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 499-500 (quoting Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States Transmitting a
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules, EXEC. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.
3-4 (1934)).
149. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1499.
150. James Grippando, Warsaw Convention - Federal Jurisdiction and Air Car-
rier Liability for Mental Injury: A Matter of Limits, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN.
59, 96 (1985).
151. See supra note 39.
152. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 30 and accompanying text.
153. Plaintiffs have recovered under Article 17 for injuries resulting from hard land-
ings as well as malfunction of aircraft pressurizing system. See DeMarines v. KLM, 433
F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Pa. 1977), afl'd, 580 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1978); Taish v. Trans World
Airlines, 390 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (Civ. Ct. 1974). See also supra note 39.
154. Sisk, supra note 9, at 147.
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ticket prices. This result would be in direct opposition to the
drafters' goal of limited liability. 55 Although the airline industry
has developed significantly since 1929, the original goal of the
parties, to encourage the growth of the industry, is still applica-
ble today. In the current economic climate, where many airlines
are struggling to avoid bankruptcy, any added liability may be
detrimental to the survival of the industry. Therefore, an expan-
sive interpretation of "l6sion corporelle," which allows for recov-
ery for emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury,
would frustrate the Convention's goal of limiting the liability of
air carriers.
Another important goal of the drafters of the Warsaw Con-
vention, to establish uniform rules to govern the rights and lia-
bilities of air carriers, 158 is also advanced by an interpretation of
Article 17 which excludes emotional damages. Although the
United States Supreme Court cited this proposition in support
of its decision to deny recovery for purely psychic damages, it
did not provide its reasoning for doing So.1 57 Nonetheless, if all
international courts were to adopt the Israeli interpretation of
the phrase "lesion corporelle," thereby allowing recovery for
emotional distress unaccompanied by physical damages under
Article 17, a forum shopping problem would undoubtedly arise.
Indeed, damages awarded by different countries may vary con-
siderably even within the limits set by the Warsaw Convention.
For example, states that have nationalized health care programs
tend to allow less recovery for torts because injured litigants do
not have to pay their medical bills and, therefore, do not need to
be reimbursed. Moreover, since standards of living may vary
considerably from one state to another, sizes of awards that are
considered reasonable vary considerably as well. Although this
problem applies to physical injuries, it is likely to be accentu-
ated in cases of pure psychic injuries. Awards for emotional dis-
tress are likely to vary from one country to the next much more
than awards for physical injuries because treatment for physical
injuries is more quantifiable. Moreover, juries' attitudes towards
the validity of psychic injuries are likely to vary depending on
local cultural values. Consequently, if emotional distress dam-
ages were encompassed in Article 17 by all parties to the Con-
155. See Montreal Agreement, supra note 30.
156. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 498.
157. Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1499 n.11 (1991).
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vention, litigants would attempt to bring their emotional distress
claims in the forum which is most likely to award high damages.
Therefore, one of the drafters' primary goals, to provide interna-
tional uniformity in air carrier liability, would be frustrated by
the determination that the phrase "16sion corporelle" encom-
passes emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury.
An issue relevant to the determination of the effect of a
broad interpretation of Article 17 on the drafters' goal of uni-
formity is whether an independent state law cause of action
might exist outside the scope of the Warsaw Convention.5 s If
the Warsaw Convention is not an exclusive remedy and plain-
tiffs are permitted to bring a separate state cause of action,
plaintiffs' possibility of recovery, and the amount of damages
they are entitled to, will depend on the laws of the different
states. Therefore, if Article 17 does not encompass emotional
distress damages, and if plaintiffs are allowed to bring state
claims for psychic injury, then some plaintiffs will be able to re-
cover under an independent state cause of action, while others
will not; thus, the drafters' goal of uniformity will be frus-
trated. 5 ' The Supreme Court of the United States specifically
refused to decide the question of whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion provides the exclusive cause of action for injuries sustained
during international air transportation because this was not an
issue in the case before it. 6 0 However, many American courts
now agree that the Warsaw Convention provides the sole source
of recovery against an international air carrier in case of acci-
dent."" Moreover, other signatories to the Warsaw Convention,
158. Karfunkel v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Grippando, supra note 150, at 98.
159. "To effect the treaty's avowed purpose [of uniform regulation of liability], the
types of injuries enumerated should be construed expansively to encompass as many
types of injury as are colorably within the ambit of the enumerated types." Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transport Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1250 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
160. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. at 1502.
161. See, e.g., Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, 737 F.2d 456, 458 (5th Cir. 1984);
Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S.
1059 (1985); Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 747 F. Supp. 670, 676 (S.D.
Fla. 1990); Stanford v. Kuwait Airlines Corp., 705 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); In
re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833, 844-45
(E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1982).
However, some courts have held that a state cause of action exists regardless of the
applicability of the Warsaw Convention. See, e.g., In re Mexico City Air Crash of Octo-
ber 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 414 (9th Cir. 1983); Calderon v. Aerovias Nacionales de Co-
lombia Avianca, 738 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Rhymes v. Arrow Air, Inc., 636 F.
Supp. 737, 740 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
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such as Great Britain and Canada, have implemented the Con-
vention as the exclusive remedy for passengers on international
flights. 182 Therefore, it is very possible that when the Supreme
Court is directly confronted with this issue, it will agree that no
separate cause of action for emotional distress can exist under
state law.16 Accordingly, the argument that emotional distress
damages should be incorporated into Article 17 so as to avoid
disparate state awards may not be relevant.
It may be argued that a broad reading of Article 17, which
would allow for compensation for purely psychic damages, would
further the drafters' third goal - the protection of passengers.
The United States Supreme Court failed to address the drafters'
goal of protecting passengers' interests. However, although the
protection of the interest of the passenger was one of the consid-
erations of the drafters of the Warsaw Convention, as evinced by
the adoption of a rebuttable presumption of carrier negligence
and the subsequent application of a strict liability standard, this
interest was balanced with the drafters' desire to limit air carrier
liability.' 64 Thus, shifting the burden of proof was the trade-off
for a lower limit on liability. Since the air carriers were the pri-
mary beneficiaries of the Warsaw Convention, it seems that pas-
senger protection was a secondary consideration to the drafters'
goal of limiting air carrier liability.'65 Therefore, it cannot be
presumed that based on their interest in protecting the rights of
passengers alone, the drafters would have necessarily wanted to
extend the scope of liability of Article 17 to encompass emo-
tional distress.
The Israeli Court's interpretation of Article 17, which allows
for recovery of purely psychic damages, gives undue weight to
the least important of the drafters' goals - the desire to protect
passengers' rights of recovery. Since this interpretation frus-
trates the two most important goals of the drafters, to limit the
liability of air carriers and to ensure international uniformity of
liability in the industry, it violates the spirit of the Convention.
The United States Supreme Court, despite its sketchy treatment
of the drafters' goals, nonetheless reached a decision which is in
conformity with those goals.
162. Sisk, supra note 9, at 156.
163. Sisk, supra note 9, at 157.
164. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 500.
165. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 10, at 500.
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V. THE ROLE OF PRECEDENCE
While acknowledging the deference owed to the earlier Is-
raeli decision, the United States Supreme Court, in Eastern Air-
lines v. Floyd, nonetheless chose to reinterpret Article 17 and
reach an opposing conclusion.166 The Israeli Supreme Court, in
Air France v. Teichner, was the first Supreme Court of any
party to the Warsaw Convention to interpret the phrase "lesion
corporelle" in Article 17. In light of the drafters' goal of creating
a uniform system of liability applicable to all countries, there is
considerable pressure for the other parties to the Convention to
follow the Israeli interpretation, despite the fact that the princi-
ple of stare decisis does not exist in international law. Indeed,
inconsistent rulings would undoubtedly open the floodgate to fo-
rum shopping.16 7 To achieve total uniformity, however, the first
court confronted with the interpretation of a paiticular provi-
sion of a treaty would unilaterally determine the meaning of the
treaty according to its own considerations and thereby bind all
other parties to the Convention to this interpretation.
It is undesirable that one country, particularly one that did
not participate in the drafting of the Convention, should have
absolute control over the interpretation of the phrase "l6sion
corporelle" within Article 17. In interpreting a treaty, countries
are sometimes influenced by considerations which are in no way
related to the policies of the treaty that they are interpreting. It
is entirely possible, for example, that in deciding Teichner, the
Supreme Court of Israel was swayed by factors unrelated to the
Warsaw Convention. As the facts of Teichner clearly show, the
case before the Israeli Court was a political, emotionally
charged, and unusual case. The Israeli community was angry
and outraged at the treatment of the hostages and closely fol-
lowed the outcome of the case. The emotional trauma that the
hostages suffered was undisputable and it was commonly per-
ceived that someone should be held liable for their injuries.
Therefore, the Israeli Supreme Court was hard pressed to en-
courage Air France to compensate the sympathetic plaintiffs.
Perhaps this pressure influenced the Court's decision to inter-
pret Article 17 as encompassing recovery for emotional distress.
166. 111 S. Ct. 1489, 1502 (1991).
167. Velasquez v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, 747 F. Supp. 670, 676 (S.D. Fla.
1990) (plaintiff who recovered for wrongful death under the Warsaw Convention is
barred from bringing the same wrongful death claim under state law).
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Thus, it would be unwise for courts of other countries to auto-
matically adopt the Israeli approach in order to conform with
the drafters' desire for a uniform system of rules governing air
carrier liability.
Despite the fact that Israel has already decided the issue,
other parties to the Convention have the authority to interpret
the phrase "l6sion corporelle" using their own analysis. Indeed,
the unilateral interpretation of a treaty by a contracting state is
not binding upon the other signatories to that agreement.'68
When interpreting the Warsaw Convention, the decisions of
other parties to the Convention should be given considerable
weight.169 But a unilateral interpretation by a signatory to the
Convention has only an advisory effect on the interpretation of
the same provision by other parties to the Convention. More-
over, since the Israeli Supreme Court could not allow for an ac-
tual remedy because the running of the statute of limitations
precluded recovery, their interpretation of Article 17 was mere
dicta that carries less persuasive authority. Thus, the Supreme
Court of the United States was justified in choosing to reinter-
pret the terms of the treaty.
VI. 'CONCLUSION
Two possibilities exist today concerning the recovery of
emotional damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention.
International courts can chose to either allow or disallow recov-
ery for emotional damages based on their own interpretation of
the phrase "lesion corporelle." This Comment urges these courts
to follow the American, rather than the Israeli, interpretation
and thereby deny recovery for emotional distress unaccompa-
nied by physical injury under Article 17.
The Israeli Supreme Court improperly interpreted Article
17 to allow for purely psychic damages. By interpreting the War-
saw Convention in light of current policies, the Court ignored its
obligation to enforce the intent of the parties to a treaty. Noth-
ing in the language, negotiating history, or postenactment inter-
pretations of Article 17 clearly evinces the intent of the drafters
to allow airline passengers to recover for purely mental injuries.
The Israeli Court focused on the fact that in 1929, when the
Warsaw Convention was drafted, French tort law allowed recov-
168. See HENKIN Er AL., supra note 64, at 442.
169. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985).
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ery for purely psychic injuries, while ignoring the fact that the
phrase "l6sion corporelle" was never specifically used to permit
such recovery. Moreover, since emotional distress injuries were
not discussed before or during the drafting of the Warsaw Con-
vention or of the subsequent protocols, it was unreasonable for
the Court to surmise that the parties intended to allow for such
recovery. Finally, the Israeli decision contradicts the spirit of the
Warsaw Convention. The Court's broad interpretation of Article
17 gives undue weight to the drafters' least important goal-the
protection of passengers, while frustrating the drafters' two
other goals of limiting air carrier liability and achieving uniform-
ity of liability within the industry. All of these factors contradict
the Israeli Supreme Court's conclusion that Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention authorized recovery of emotional damages
unaccompanied by physical injury in aircraft accidents.
On the other hand, the interpretation of Article 17 adopted
by the United States Supreme Court, which prohibits recovery
for purely psychic injuries, reflects the intent and the goals of
the drafters of the Convention more accurately. The Court em-
braced the spirit of Article 17, despite the fact that it ignored
the drafters' goal of protecting passengers and contradicted one
of its own central arguments about the inferences that can be
drawn from a drafting change where there is no clear showing of
an intent to alter the scope of liability. The Supreme Court's
interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the French legal
meaning of the phrase "lesion corporelle" as well as the prior
and subsequent history of the Warsaw Convention. Moreover,
restricting the scope of liability of air carriers under Article 17 to
exclude liability for purely psychic injuries advances the draft-
ers' primary goal of limiting the liability of air carriers by dis-
couraging widespread litigation on the part of passengers who
suffer emotional trauma while travelling on an aircraft.
Dafna Yoran
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